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Abstract 
 
Property-based testing is a testing technique that evaluates executions of a 
program. The method checks that specifications, called properties, hold 
throughout the execution of the program. TASpec is a language used to specify 
these properties. This paper compares some attributes of the language with the 
specification patterns used for model-checking languages, and then presents some 
descriptions of properties that can be used to detect common security flaws in 
programs.  This report describes the results of a one year research project at the 
University of California, Davis, which was funded by a University Collaboration 
LDRD entitled “Property-based Testing for Cyber Security Assurance”. 
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 1 Introduction 
Property-based testing is a technique for testing the security of programs. Recall that 
secure means conforming to a security policy. The analyst doing the testing first specifies 
the properties she wishes the program to conform to. The program is then instrumented 
based on the specification of the properties. Consider the execution of the program as a 
state machine, where as each instruction is executed, the state of the program changes. 
Relevant changes affect only those portions of the state used in the properties. The 
instrumentation produces output whenever such a change occurs. The program is then 
executed under control of another program called the test execution monitor (TEM). The 
TEM is given the properties, and whenever the execution enters a state forbidden by the 
specified by the properties, it reports a security error. 
  
These properties are written in a little language (called TASPEC) with constructs 
designed to aid testing. These include location specifiers (which specify specific places in 
the program where the properties hold, or where the state of the executing program will 
change), assertion statements (which assert that a certain property now holds), retraction 
statements (which assert that a certain property no longer holds), and temporal 
relationship operators (which specify whether something occurs before or after something 
else, or should occur and hold for the rest of the execution). 
 
This report first compares TASpec to other specification languages. We then examine 
some of the temporal operators used in TASpec in considerable detail. We analyze their 
precise meaning and show how to capture some of the notions in model checking and 
temporal logic languages using TASpec constructs. We conclude by presenting 
specifications of properties of programs that attackers commonly exploit in order to 
compromise the program (and, usually, the system on which the program runs). 
 
A word about motivation will clarify the goals of this report. The software life cycle, in 
terms of assurance, is usually described using the Waterfall Life Cycle Model. The 
relevant stages of that model are: 
1. Requirements definition and analysis, in which the specifications of the program 
or system are created and validated; 
2. Design, during which the program or system is architected, and the design is 
validated; 
3. Implementation, in which the program or system is created and tested; 
4. Integration and system testing, in which a set of programs are brought together 
and their union is tested and validated; and 
5. Operation and maintenance, in which the program or system is deployed and 
used. 
TASpec fits into the life cycle at steps 3 and 4, because it is a language tied to the 
implementation of the program or system. However, the properties it must validate are 
often the same as, or derived from, properties that the design must meet. The design 
properties may be stated using a model checking language such as LTL. This naturally 
leads to the question of whether TASpec can describe the properties that LTL can 
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describe, although at an implementation level. This is the reason for the analysis of the 
operators in TASpec. 
 
That said, there are vulnerabilities specific to an implementation that may have no 
counterpart to design flaws. For example, buffer overflows arise from a failure to check 
bounds. Models of systems and software usually do not have states in which the failure to 
check bounds causes a transition, unless that failure is necessary for some reason. The 
model is at a level of abstraction in which this detail of checking is not relevant, and so is 
omitted. But it cannot be ignored at the implementation level. Hence, TASpec must be 
able to express these properties. 
 
The next section reviews TASpec very briefly to provide background. The third section 
discusses the temporal operators of TASpec with an emphasis on aspects found in LTL, a 
model checking language. The fourth presents some common implementation 
vulnerabilities and the TASpec properties that detect them 
 
2 TASpec and Property-Based Testing 
 
The goal of property-based testing is to validate that a program satisfies a set of 
specifications, called “properties”. The program to be validated is called the “target 
program.” 
 
As with formal methods, we do not discuss the derivation of requirements or, from them, 
specifications. We simply assume that the specifications are known. We also assume they 
are written in a low-level specification language (called “TASpec”) that describes the 
specifications in terms of the program being validated. We distinguish this type of 
specification from the higher-level specifications of formal methods by calling the former 
“properties.” 
 
The first step in property-based testing is instrumentation. The property file, which 
contains the properties, is analyzed to determine which variables and functions will affect 
the properties. A program called the slicer eliminates all code in the target program that 
does not affect the properties. After slicing, the only paths of control and of data flow in 
the program are those that could affect the program.1 The resulting program satisfies the 
properties if, and only if, the original program satisfies the properties. Next, a second 
program called the instrumenter adds instructions to the target program to emit special 
directives describing changes of program state whenever a change of state occurs that 
could affect the desired properties. For example, suppose the property were “x > 5”. The 
following fragment 
if (y > 6) then x := 3; else x := 6 
would be instrumented to output the value of x after each part of the statement: 
                                                 
1 This step can be omitted if the resulting reduction in program size is too small. For example, 
if the target program is in C, programs can be reduced in size by 80%., so slicing is 
worthwhile. If the target program is in C++ or Java, the reduction in size is typically much 
smaller. 
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if (y > 6) then begin 
 x = 3; print “assert x = 3”; 
end else begin 
 x = 6; print “assert x = 6”; 
end 
The directives will be saved in a file called the “state file” for later analysis. 
 
The next step is execution. The program is executed with appropriate test data. Ideally, all 
paths of execution should be tested. In practice, this number is too large, so some fraction 
of those paths are executed. Failure to test all paths means that some flows of control 
have not been validated. This illustrates the difference between validation and 
verification (in which all paths would be shown to be correct) as well as the need for 
careful test data generation. The inputs to each run are saved with the corresponding state 
file. 
 
The final step is analysis. A third program, called the test execution monitor or TEM, 
takes the property file and the state file, and tests whether the directives show that the 
properties have been violated. If so, the precise property violated, and the location at 
which the property was violated, will be printed. 
 
These steps differ from those for formal verification in two key ways. First, formal 
verification is primarily an a priori technique for developing correct code, although it can 
be used to prove an existing program correct. Property-based testing is strictly an a 
posteriori testing technique. It requires an existing program to use. Secondly, the focus of 
property-based testing is on the implementation rather than the higher-level layers of 
abstraction such as design. The properties are written in a little language similar to that of 
the target program. In formal verification, design is to be verified as well as 
implementation. So the language of specification is more abstract. 
 
2.1 How TASpec Works 
 
A brief description of the mechanics of TASpec and the TEM will be helpful in what 
follows. When the instrumented target program emits directives describing changes of 
program state, those changes have the form of assertions or retractions of particular 
predicates (called facts). The desired properties are expressed in terms of these 
predicates.  As each assertion is emitted, the predicate being asserted is added to a 
database; as each retraction is emitted, the predicate being retracted is deleted from that 
database. At each step, the TEM ensures that the facts in the database do not violate any 
of the properties. 
 
Basically, the state of the program execution is encapsulated in the set of facts in the 
database. 
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3 TASpec and Model Checking Languages 
 
Our first question is the relationship between the language constructs in TASpec and the 
logic languages used to do model checking, as discussed earlier. For our purposes, we 
focus on the temporal operators. 
3.1 Taxonomy 
 
We use the taxonomy described in [3] to categorize TASpec as a hybrid approach 
between a history-based and a state-based specification language. 
 
State-based specification has been traditionally used for sequential programs while 
history-based specification with temporal logic has been traditionally used for concurrent 
programs. 
 
In history-based specification, time can be either linear or branching. Linear time makes 
assertions about paths and at each moment, there is only one possible future. Branching 
time has a treelike nature. Assertions are made about states and at each moment time may 
be split into alternate courses representing different possible futures [2]. Branching time 
views events as concurrent “alternative universes” [1, p. 954]. 
 
TASpec implements a form of “history” that describes preconditions such as “predicate A 
must be true before predicate B becomes true”. It does not keep track of events that 
happened in the past. 
 
TASpec is a state-based specification language that focuses on functional requirements 
describing what the software is expected to do. Aside from the state-based paradigm, it 
borrows temporal logic from history-based specification languages. While the temporal 
operators do not increase its capability to express properties of programs, the temporal 
logic does allow some security properties to be expressed easily and clearly. History-
based specification languages were designed for dealing with concurrent systems and 
systems that simulate real-time. TASpec is unique in using temporal logic because it 
deals with single threaded programs, and therefore linear time. TASpec fits into the 
discrete time paradigm because each state represents a discrete point in time. 
 
If not designed carefully, specification languages can be cumbersome for expressing 
certain properties. Temporal logic does not enhance ease of expression when dealing with 
single threaded programs. It may make coding specifications easier and clearer, therefore 
reducing greatly the chances of introducing error in a specification. But even with 
temporal operators, simple specifications can require complex expressions.  For example, 
consider a simple ordering property for moving an elevator. Between the time an elevator 
is summoned to a floor, and the time it opens its doors at that floor, the elevator can 
arrive at that floor at most twice [4]. This simple property requires “six levels of operator 
nesting in linear temporal logic” [3]. 
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But without temporal operators, expressing temporal relationships between states and 
events becomes unnatural.  Extra variables need to be added to indicate whether certain 
events happened, thereby making writing the specification more complex. Z is an 
example of a commonly used state-based specification language that lacks temporal 
operators. 
 
3.2 Branching and Linear Time 
 
Branching and linear time has more to do with how a person views reality. In the case of 
TASpec, we are only handling the case of single threaded programs, so the discussion 
about concurrent programs in [Lamport80] does not apply. We think the concept of linear 
and branching temporal logic can be applied in the following way.  If a program has all 
information which it needs to run, before the program starts (such as a calculation 
intensive program), we consider that linear time logic is the more appropriate paradigm 
because we have all the information before the program starts to determine what the final 
result will be. If a program takes external input as it is running, we consider branching 
logic to be more appropriate because at any input state in the program, the next state 
depends upon the external input that may not be known when the program started. 
 
3.3 Time and before and until Temporal Operators 
 
In specification, there is a notion of “strong” and “weak” versions of the before and until 
temporal operators. Let A and B be states of the program. For the strong version of 
before, A before B means that if the execution enters state A, then the execution will 
enter state B at some point before the execution terminates. If the execution enters state A 
and thereafter never enters state B, then the expression is false. The expression becomes 
true only if state B is entered, and state A was entered before state B was entered. By 
comparison, for the weak version of before, A before B means that if the execution 
entered state A, it may or may not enter state B. As soon as state A is entered, the 
expression becomes true whether or not state B is entered subsequently. This expression 
is false if state B is entered before state A is entered. 
 
However, the fundamental difference between checking specifications in TASpec and in 
logic creates a problem with mapping operators. Consider the before operator in (most) 
temporal logics. If A happened in the past, but is no longer true when B, then A before B 
would be true. Now consider the same operator in TASpec, and recall TASpec considers 
states A and B as facts in a database. These facts may be asserted (added to the database 
of current facts) or retracted (removed from the database of current facts). All checking is 
done over the set of current facts in the database. This means that if state A is entered, 
then left, then state B is entered, there is no indication that when state B is entered (and 
the fact corresponding to B is in the database), that state A held earlier (because as state 
A holds no longer, the fact corresponding to state A has been retracted from the database 
and is not there). 
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The TASpec interpretation of the before temporal operator actually states a precondition. 
So,  A before B means “fact A is asserted before fact B is asserted, and must be asserted 
when B is asserted”. Because multiple assertions are allowed, this definition needs to be 
made more precise. With multiple assertions, it is possible that A could be retracted in the 
same event that asserts B, in which case A before B would be false. So we should say that 
A must be asserted when B is first asserted. This means that the TASpec equivalent of 
“strong before” is: 
A implies ((A before B) and eventually B) 
 
But what if fact A needs to remain asserted throughout the whole time that B is asserted? 
For example, for the fact Authenticated(user) (meaning the user is authenticated) and the 
fact LoggedIn(user) (meaning the user has logged in), we want the property that 
Authenticated(user) is asserted before LoggedIn(user)  is asserted, and 
Authenticated(user) remains asserted while LoggedIn(user) is asserted. How can we 
express that? We might use two properties to express this: 
A before B 
(A and B) until (not B) 
 
In terms of strength, the TASpec before operator is weak, and the TASpec until operator 
is strong. The reason for this choice is simply that the security properties found so far 
were easier to express using this arrangement. An alternate arrangement would work 
equally well. 
3.4 Expressibility 
 
There is a tension between how easily a property can be expressed and how powerful the 
language is. It is the same tension that is found between high level and low level 
programming languages. Programming in a high level language like Modula makes high-
level tasks easy, but the programmer loses the ability to access the machine architecture 
directly, as she can do when programming in assembly language. But the effort to write 
an accounting system (for example) in assembly language is much higher than in Modula, 
and the programmer is more prone to make a mistake. 
 
Intuitively, we would like to be able to express every kind of property in one language. 
Someone may create a language in which this is possible. But, as [Lamport80] mentions, 
“this approach is based upon the misguided notion that the more expressive a system is, 
the better it is.” We have high level languages to create an abstraction in order to hide the 
irrelevant details of the specific model we are working with. 
 
TASpec has some limits that make expressing certain types of properties difficult. For 
example, consider the issue of “bounds”, where one wants to say that between states P 
and R, the system is always in state Q. In many logics, this could be expressed as: 
(P before Q) and (Q before R) 
In TASpec, because of the representation of states as facts in the database, this is more 
complex: 
(not P) implies (not Q) 
P implies Q 
Q and not R 
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Taking these three properties together, we have: 
• If fact P has not been asserted, then if fact Q is asserted, the first property fails; 
• If fact P has been asserted and fact Q has not been asserted, the second property 
fails; 
• If fact R has been asserted and fact Q remains asserted, the third property fails 
Combining these three statements, we have the desired result. 
 
Now consider an “after” operator. This is more complex, because the TASpec before 
operator is weak. Expressing “A before B and ~A after B all the way to the end of the 
execution” would require converting the “after” operator to some expression using the 
before operator. A strong before operator would do this nicely, but the TASpec before 
operator is weak. So, this expression takes two steps: 
1. Convert the “after” operator into a form using the strong “before” operator. This 
gives: 
(A before B) and not ((B before not A) “strong before” A) 
2. Express the strong “before” operator using the weak before operator, as described 
above. 
 
This demonstrates the difficulty of mapping model checking specifications to TASpec. 
The reason for the difficulty is that the languages are fundamentally different, in that 
TASpec uses the model of facts in a database and logic languages use events. An event 
occurs. A fact is in the database or not in the database, but in TASpec’s model one can 
record that a fact was in the database but is no longer there only by entering another fact 
in the database. This makes the underlying model of TASpec more like an assembly 
language, and the model-checking languages more like higher level languages. 
Intuitively, this makes sense, as TASpec deals with a much lower level of detail than is 
found in most models. 
 
4 Common Vulnerabilities 
 
Four common vulnerabilities are the escalation of privileges before authentication, buffer 
overflows, race conditions involving file accesses, and the ability to access files using a 
web server because the server does not adequately check the path name of the requested 
file. In this section, we present descriptions of how to write properties that will handle 
these problems. We assume a UNIX-like environment (this includes Linux), and present 
the first three properties for C programs, and the fourth for Java programs.  
4.1 Privilege Escalation Without Authentication2 
The problem of escalating privileges when a user has not properly authenticated herself 
arises because of programming flaws in most cases. In the UNIX world, consider the 
following program fragment: 
                                                 
2 This is adapted from Fink and Bishop [6]. 
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/* get user name */ 
if (fgets(stdin, uname, sizeof(uname)–1) == NULL) 
 return(FAILED); 
/* get user password */ 
typedpwd = getpass(“Password: “); 
/* now get information about user with that name */ 
if ((pw = getpwnam(uname)) != NULL){ 
 /* generate user’s password hash */ 
 hashtp = crypt(pw->pw_passwd, typedpwd); 
 /* compare this to stored hash; 
  if match, grant access */ 
 if (strcmp(pw->pw_passwd, hashtp) == 0){ 
  /* match -- grant access */ 
  setuid(pw->pw_uid); 
  return(SUCCESS); 
 } 
 /* didn’t match -- fall through to deny access 
*/ 
} 
return(FAILED); 
This fragment reads a user’s name into a buffer, obtains the password from the user, and 
then validates it. If the password is correct, the user acquires privileges (the setuid system 
call). If not, an error code is returned. 
 
Although this segment of code is straightforward, the escalation often occurs long after 
the authentication. If the programmer errs, the escalation may occur despite a user’s 
having incorrectly authenticated herself. A bug in an FTP server illustrated this. The 
program authenticated the user, and set a “correct authentication” flag. If the user then 
tried to change to a new login (say, root), but entered an incorrect password, the 
authentication would fail but the flag would not be reset. As obtaining privileges was 
contingent on the flag being set, the user would promptly acquire root privileges without 
authorization. 
 
We define a set of properties to capture the various states. The authentication process 
begins when a name is mapped to a set of privileges (pwent->pw_uid) and a password. 
This property is described as: 
location func getpwnam(name) result pwent 
 { assert user_password(name, 
  pwent->pw_passwd, pwent->pw_uid); } 
This instructs the instrumenter to add code to assert the predicate 
user_password(name, password, UID) 
with name, password, and UID the values stored in the variables name, pwent->passwd, 
and pwent->pw_uid, respectively. 
 
The next state occurs when the cleartext password is hashed to produce the stored 
password. This property is described as: 
location func crypt(password,salt) result encryptpwd 
 { assert password_entered(encryptpwd); } 
This instructs the instrumenter to add code to assert the predicate 
password_entered(hash) 
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where hash is the value returned by the function crypt, which is in fact a hash computed 
in the same way that a stored password is derived from the correct cleartext password. 
 
The next state is entered when the computed hash is compared to the stored password: 
location func strcmp(s1, s2) result 0 
 { assert equals(s1, s2); } 
 
At this point, the user would enter the authenticated state if the following holds: 
password_entered(pwd1) and 
 user_password(name, pwd2, uid) and 
  equal(pwd1, pwd2) 
 { assert authenticated(uid) ; } 
Note this property is not tied to any function in the program. If, at any point, the three 
assertions joined by “and” in the above property hold, the predicate “authenticated(uid)” 
becomes asserted—and the “uid” corresponds to that of the predicate “user_password”. 
 
Finally, when privileges are escalated, we need to indicate this change of state. The 
relevant property is: 
location func setuid(uid) result 1 
  { assert access_acquired(uid); } 
Note this includes the UID to which privileges are given. 
 
To tie all this together, we require that one authenticate as a particular user before being 
given privileges of that user: 
check authenticated(uid) before access_acquired(uid) 
 
Now, let us consider two executions of this program. In the first, all proceeds as 
expected. The user “me” with UID 917 provides the correct password. During execution 
of the code fragment, after the setuid system call, the set of facts in the database is: 
 
user_password(“me”, “xyz”, 917) 
password_entered(“xyz”) 
equals(“xyz”, “xyz”) 
authenticated(917) 
access_acquired(917) 
 
At this point, the predicate 
authenticated(917) before access_acquired(917) 
holds, and no violations are found. But now the same user tries to become root, and 
supplies an incorrect password. After this (second) execution of the setuid system call, 
the database contains: 
 
user_password(“me”, “xyz”, 917) 
password_entered(“xyz”) 
equals(“xyz”, “xyz”) 
authenticated(917) 
access_acquired(917) 
user_password(“root”, “abc”, 0) 
password_entered(“xyz”) 
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equals(“abc”, “xyz”) 
access_acquired(0) 
Now the property 
authenticated(0) before access_acquired(0) 
is false, and the TEM would report a violation. 
4.2 File Creation Race Condition3 
This flaw arises when two actions, in this example file creation and changing file 
ownership, are sequential and a third action can occur between the two. Consider a 
program executing as root that performs the following sequence of actions: 
 Create file 
 Read data from another program, adding it to file 
 Close file 
 Change ownership of file from root to user 
If reading the data takes long enough for someone else to change the binding of the file 
name (used for the “create” and the “change ownership”) to the file object, then the file 
whose ownership is changed will not be the one that was created. This can allow an 
unprivileged user to create a privileged program without authorization. 
 
The relevant code fragment is: 
 /* create the file */ 
 if ((fd = creat(“xyz”, O_WRITE) >= 0){ 
  /* read input and copy it to the 
   created file */ 
  while(read(buf, 1000, finp) > 0) 
   write(buf, n, fd); 
  /* close it */ 
  close(fd); 
  /* change ownership from root to 
   user 917 group 10 */ 
  chown(“xyz”, 917, 10); 
 } 
 
The race condition is exploited by a second program (one that does the rebinding). But as 
noted earlier, TASpec does not deal with concurrent programs. So, we look for system 
calls and functions that can block execution, such as the “read” function. Then a window 
of time during which the race condition can be exploited can be detected. 
 
This involves two states. The first is access(file), in which the named file is being 
accessed. The second is block(file), in which the race condition exists. They work 
together as follows. 
 
When the file is created, the process enters the access(file) state, and is not in the 
block(file) state. This is expressed as: 
location func creat(file){ 
 assert access(file); retract block(file); 
} 
                                                 
3  This is adapted from Fink [7]. 
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When the file is read, if the process is in the access(file) state, it then enters the block(file) 
state. The relevant property is: 
location func read(){ 
 if access(file) { assert block(file) }; 
} 
Note here the file name carries over from the last creat system call. When the file’s 
ownership is changed, the process must not be in the block(file) state. That is expressed 
as: 
location func chown(file, user, group){ 
 check not block(file); 
} 
Consider the database when the above code fragment is executed. After the creat, the 
database contains: 
 access(“xyz”) 
After the while loop, the database contains: 
 access(“xyz”) 
 block(“xyz”) 
 ... 
where the block(“xyz”) predicate is repeated as many times as the loop is executed. 
When the chown system call is executed, the property 
 not block(“xyz”) 
is tested, and fails. So this reports that a race condition exists. 
4.3 Buffer Overflows 
Buffer overflows are pernicious. A common source of buffer overflows is in the redaction 
of command line arguments. For example, in the fragment: 
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) 
{ 
 char pname[1024]; 
 for(i = 0; argv[0]; i++) 
  pname[i] = argv[0][i]; 
 pname[i] = ‘\0’ 
there is an implicit assumption that the name of the program (argv[0] will not be more 
than 1023 characters long. If it is, a buffer overflow will result. 
 
First, we need to define a property that describes buffer overflow. It occurs when an array 
reference is out of bounds. Every array has an upper bound (for pname, 1023) and a 
lower bound (for pname, 0). Our property will say that when an array reference to 
element i occurs, and the array’s bounds are l (lower) and u (upper), then l _ i and i _ u 
must both hold. 
 
We define the predicate array(pname, 0, 1023) to mean that the array pname was 
declared with upper bound 1023 and lower bound 0. We define the predicate 
arrayref(pname, i) to mean that element i of array pname was referenced. The property to 
be tested is then: 
check array(aname,lower,upper) and arrayref(aname,index) 
  implies (lower <= index and index <= upper) 
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Note that we need not explicitly name the array in the property. The TEM will validate 
all array references when checking the property. 
 
Next, we must instruct the instrumenter to put these predicates, and the property, into the 
source file appropriately. We use location specifiers to do this. The property file is: 
location decl pname[1024] { 
 assert array(pname, 0, 1023); } 
location variable pname[i] { 
 assert arrayref(pname, i); 
 check array(aname,lower,upper) and  
  arrayref(aname,index) 
     implies (lower <= index and index <= upper); 
} 
 
Unlike the property, the “pname” and “i” in the first two lines must match the variables in 
the program. The instrumenter will transform the code fragment above into the following 
(conceptually; several implementation-level details and error checking are omitted): 
 
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) 
{ 
 char pname[1024]; 
 tf = open(“directivefile”, WR_ONLY); 
 fprintf(tf, “assert array(pname, 0, 1023)\n”); 
 for(i = 0; argv[0]; i++){ 
  fprintf(tf, “assert arrayref(pname, i)\n”); 
  fprintf(tf, “check ...\n”); 
  pname[i] = argv[0][i]; 
 } 
 fprintf(tf, “assert arrayref(pname, i)\n”); 
 fprintf(tf, “check ...\n”); 
 pname[i] = ‘\0’ 
 
(The “check ...” refers to the entire check in the property file; it is elided for clarity.) The 
program containing this code fragment can now be compiled and executed. 
 
Assume the program is given a name of 1025 characters. When the run is complete, the 
state file will contain: 
assert array(pname, 0, 1023); 
assert arrayref(pname, 0); 
check array(aname,lower,upper) and arrayref(aname,index) 
  implies (lower <= index and index <= upper); 
... 
assert arrayref(pname, 1024); 
check array(aname,lower,upper) and arrayref(aname,index) 
  implies (lower <= index and index <= upper); 
assert arrayref(pname, 1025); 
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check array(aname,lower,upper) and arrayref(aname,index) 
  implies (lower <= index and index <= upper); 
(the ellipsis indicates 1023 lines elided). When the TEM is run over this state file, the 
property will be checked at every arrayref, because both predicates hold. At the next-to-
last check above, the antecedents are true, but the consequent is false, as index is 1024. 
Hence the TEM will report a violation of the property. 
4.4 Improper Web Server Restriction 
The next bug is one common to older web servers. When a web browser connects to a 
web server, the web server gives the browser access to a hierarchy of files. The area 
accessible to the browser is to be restricted to the top-level directory of this hierarchy, 
and its descendents. Hence an attempt to access the file “../../../../../etc/passwd” should 
fail if made from the top-level directory. The “..” means to access the parent directory. 
That directory exists on the web server, but the software should block access to it. 
Unfortunately, many web servers do not restrict this type of access. In this case, attackers 
can read system and other files not in the web hierarchy. 
 
As a test of the Java implementation of property-based testing, we obtained a Java web 
server and had a student delete the checks for this flaw. We then used property-based 
testing to determine whether the flaw existed. 
 
The basic structure of the relevant parts of the web server are as follows. A method called 
HttpWorker.doit() is given the URL from the browser. If the URL is illegal in any way, 
the web server throws an exception with that URL passed as a parameter. 
 
First, we define the property. For this example, we will assume there are no 
subdirectories of the hierarchy. This simplifies the statement of properties without 
changing the basic ideas. Again, we define two predicates. The first, hasDotDot(url), 
asserts that the URL url has the “..” in it. The second, causedException(req), asserts that 
the URL req caused an exception to be thrown. Then the property of interest is: 
check hasDotDot(url) implies causedException(url); 
because if hasDotDot(url) is true, and causedException(url) is true, the URL referred to 
the parent directory and was caught. But if hasDotDot(url) is true and 
causedException(url) is not asserted, then the invalid URL is not caught and the property 
was violated. 
 
We next instrument the server. The assertion for a URL referring to the parent goes, as 
indicated, at the beginning of HttpWorker.doit(): 
location assign HttpWorker.doit()::req result r 
 if “r.getRequestURI.indexOf(\”../\”) > -1” { 
  assert hasDotDot(r); 
} 
This says to check whenever something is assigned to the variable req in the function 
doit() in the class HttpWorker. If the new value of req contains “..” (the “if” part) then the 
program will output the appropriate assertion. Similarly, the assertion for exceptions is 
output when the reply function in the exception part of the class is called: 
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location funcall HttpException::reply(HttpRequest req, 
       HttpResponse res){ 
 assert causedexception(req); 
} 
This binds the assert to the call to the reply function in the class HttpException. Note the 
URL is output; the specific response sent is irrelevant to the property. 
 
When the instrumented web server was run, and a browser requested an illegal URL, the 
state file contained: 
check hasDotDot(Areq) implies causedException(Areq); 
assert hasdoddot(“/../../../../../etc/passwd”); 
check hasDotDot(Areq) implies causedException(Areq); 
The first line is vacuously true, as hasDotDot(Areq) has not been asserted. The last line, 
however, is false, because hasDotDot(“/../../../../../etc/passwd”) is asserted, but the 
corresponding  causedException(“/../../../../../etc/passwd”) has not been asserted. 
 
As a control, the same sequence of URLs was requested from an instrumented but correct 
version of the same web server. The state file for that version of the program contained: 
check hasDotDot(Areq) implies causedException(Areq); 
assert hasdoddot(“/../../../../../etc/passwd”); 
assert causedException(“/../../../../../etc/passwd”); 
check hasDotDot(Areq) implies causedException(Areq); 
Both hasDotDot(“/../../../../../etc/passwd”) and causedException(“/../../../../../etc/passwd”) 
have been asserted when the final check is made. 
4.5 Summary 
This section presented four examples of programs with common flaws. We showed the 
properties that described each, and the instrumenting necessary to enable the TEM to 
detect changes of state that affect the truth of the properties as the program runs. These 
examples demonstrate the usefulness of this testing methodology. 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
Although it is used to specify properties that programs must satisfy, TASPec is different 
from logic languages used to do model checking. The key difference comes from 
TASpec’s model of events (state changes are represented as facts in a database), which 
differs from the notion of state changes used in model checking. TASpec’s lack of history 
constructs increases the complexity of expressing some temporal events. Fortunately, as 
shown by the description of several common vulnerabilities above, these do not affect the 
use of TASpec to describe many common implementation flaws. 
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